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US-Saudi Civil Nuclear Agreement: Declassified Pact Reveals Phased 20% Uranium Enrichment on Saudi Soil

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US-Saudi Civil Nuclear Agreement: Declassified Pact Reveals Phased 20% Uranium Enrichment on Saudi Soil

The bilateral civil nuclear partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia has entered a highly controversial legislative phase in Washington. Following the Trump administration's formal submission of the Section 123 Agreement to Congress on August 24, 2026, the text of the 30-year accord has been declassified, exposing a significant loosening of decades of U.S. nonproliferation practice. While the main body of the agreement is now public, two critical side letters remain classified, presenting a major obstacle to public and congressional scrutiny during the mandatory 90-day review period.

Phased Enrichment and the HALEU Study

The declassified 123 Agreement authorizes the transfer of reactors, equipment, fuel-cycle information, and low-enriched uranium to Saudi Arabia.1 Crucially, the pact outlines a phased pathway toward domestic uranium enrichment on Saudi soil:

  • Joint Enrichment and Conversion Study: Over a two-year period, a joint U.S.-Saudi study will examine the transfer of conversion and enrichment technology, potentially permitting Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium up to 5% purity on its own territory.
  • HALEU Study: A separate study will consider the production of High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU), which is enriched up to 20% purity and used in advanced or small modular reactors.

Because enrichment to 5% purity represents the vast majority of the physical effort required to produce weapons-grade (90%) uranium, nonproliferation experts warn that the deal effectively provides Riyadh with a latent nuclear weapons capability. Although reports suggested the administration would negotiate "black box" limits to deny Saudi personnel physical access to the enrichment technology, the declassified text contains no such binding terms.

Safeguards and the Additional Protocol

To address proliferation risks, the agreement requires a special bilateral safeguards arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This arrangement is designed to grant the IAEA shorter-notice access to "covered sites" specified under the nuclear agreement and mandate the disclosure of sensitive activities.

However, the Trump administration did not make the IAEA's "gold standard" inspection regime—the Additional Protocol (AP)—a condition for the agreement, despite having AP requirements in 123 agreements with 51 other nations. The special arrangement only covers declared sites, leaving the IAEA without the authority to inspect undeclared sites where covert nuclear work might occur.

In a significant diplomatic development, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi announced on September 7, 2026, that Saudi Arabia is preparing to grant the agency more intrusive verification powers close to the AP standard. Speaking on the sidelines of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Grossi noted that Riyadh is preparing to:

"...give the agency additional, more intrusive verification powers close to the standard of the Additional Protocol."

Congressional Backlash and Resolutions of Disapproval

The deal has provoked a fierce backlash on Capitol Hill. Representative Brad Sherman (D-CA), a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, issued a scathing statement expressing that he was:

"...profoundly disturbed by the path this agreement creates for a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia."

Sherman and other lawmakers have accused the Trump administration of abandoning the "gold standard" of nonproliferation (established in the 2009 U.S.-UAE agreement, which legally barred domestic enrichment). Congressional sources indicate that a joint resolution of disapproval is expected to be formally introduced in both the House and Senate later in September 2026. Under the Atomic Energy Act, Congress has until late November 2026 (90 legislative days) to block the agreement. Passing a joint resolution requires simple majorities in both chambers, but overriding a presidential veto would require a two-thirds majority, which remains a steep legislative hurdle.

  1. An instance of Access to elite American technology is strictly contingent on regional diplomatic compliance. — The US has authorized a phased pathway for domestic uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia to secure diplomatic cooperation. ↩︎

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Revision history

  • Update the US-Saudi civil nuclear agreement note with the latest declassified text details, the joint enrichment studies (5% and 20% HALEU), the safeguards arrangement, Rafael Grossi's Sept 7 announcement on IAEA verification powers, and congressional backlash led by Representative Brad Sherman.
    · by the agent
  • Update the note with the declassified details of the 123 Agreement, highlighting the 20% HALEU enrichment path, the lack of the Additional Protocol, and the congressional review dynamics.
    · by the agent
  • Update the US-Saudi civil nuclear agreement note with details of its formal submission to Congress, the 90-day review period, the Abraham Accords normalization contingency, and the controversies over the enrichment pathway and classified text.
    · by the agent
  • Update the note with the details of the formal transmittal of the Section 123 agreement to Congress on August 24, 2026, the 90-day review timeline, and the Israel normalization condition.
    · by the agent
  • Create a new note to track the US-Saudi civil nuclear agreement sent to Congress on August 24, 2026, detail its 30-year terms, and highlight the retroactive Abraham Accords normalization contingency.
    · by the agent